18 November 2019

Meir Ettinger 11/18/19 – A War for Peace

A War for Peace by Meir Ettinger
We are happy to hear about a number of dead terrorists, but we need to deepen our understanding of the strategic and broad trends that the IDF leadership has been following in recent years.

We are already behind another round of fighting last week in the Gaza Strip, in which hundreds of rockets were fired at the State of Israel, half of the country was disabled, and twenty-five terrorists mainly from Islamic Jihad were killed by IDF fire.

The last round opens with the assassination of the terrorist Baha Abu al-Ata - an area commander of the Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip who, according to the IDF, was responsible for several missile launches toward Israel in the past year and ended with a ceasefire followed by the rocket barrage this time by the Resistance Committees. "And another rocket fire on Saturday night, so to speak, of Hamas "rogue “.

Alongside the criticism of the deterrence that led to the assassination of a third-degree officer in a small, semi-state-backed terrorist organization, right-wing cheers were heard on the 'victorious blow' to the Islamic Jihad, the elimination of the rocket launchers finished without Hamas joining the campaign. It is not always pleasant to be in the role of captivating the joys, but it turns out that these joys are due to a lack of understanding of the purpose of the operation in the strategic perspective of its initiators.

We are pleased, and rightly so, to hear of a number of dead terrorists, as if it is restoring the trampled respect of the people of Israel that this government has humiliated. But those who want to be an alternative to the existing establishment need to deepen their understanding of the strategic and broad trends of the IDF leadership in recent years. Examining the ideas published by senior IDF officials and the security policy makes it clear that the research institutes and the think tanks in the IDF, the loss of deterrence and the humiliation of national dignity (which is the glory of God) will not easily change with the identity of one minister of defense or another but require a deeper scrutiny.

In recent years, we have already become accustomed to the permanent response to any rocket or rocket fire attempts in the Gaza Strip "We see Hamas responsible for everything that is done in the Gaza Strip", the same wording accompanied the policy (in speech, certainly not in acts) in every Gaza fighting round in the last decade, this wording has disappeared The latter, on the contrary, one of the cabinet members stated that one of the objectives of the operation was to keep Hamas out of the round.

The answer is simple: In the security system, the decision was made to come to terms with the Hamas terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip, and to replace the decision in the regulation. And when they do not intend and do not want to overpower the killers, it makes no sense to threaten them with the responsibility, when there are no bullets in the gun.

About two months ago, all media sites featured articles depicting Baha Abu al-Ata as a rogue commander interrupting the Hamas deal. And those who know a little about how the media works, immediately noticed that these were IDF spokesperson briefs that marked the mastermind's "problematic cause." The purpose of the last operation was not the decision of the Hamas terrorist organization, but the exact opposite - the removal of the interfering factors with the Hamas series.

From the first moment after the killing of Abu al-Ata, the IDF spokesman announced that it was not a return to the policy of counterterrorism [i think the word here should be ’targeted assassinations, as I heard them say so] and for long hours the rocket fire from Gaza that disrupted life not only in the Gaza envelope accustomed to life under fire but also in Gush Dan, was answered quietly by Israel. The rocket fire and the IDF continued to attack | (Indeed, relatively in the attempt to strike and eliminate more jihad terrorists than we have become used to in recent years), every effort has been made to keep Hamas out of the picture.

The reason for this is clear, but not enough known or at least insufficiently structured for the public - the strategic plan of the IDF leadership and Netanyahu and its environment is the existence of the series against Hamas, the series that means achieving long-term ceasefire agreements in exchange for easing the Gaza blockade in stages. Maritime port and opening of crossings, all this when Hamas does not give up its desire to destroy the Jews of Israel, but only rejects it later. If not many years ago, Hamas' status was similar to that of Islamic Jihad today, then five years ago. Not dreaming to talk to Hamas, Netanyahu stated the need to overthrow Hamas rule, now the Hamas terror organization, which continues to try and to carry out murderous attacks in Judea and Samaria has become a legitimate cause, with the whole purpose of the operation being to enable the arrangement to exist.

Half an anniversary ago, the Oslo agreement was signed, the IDF withdrew from the cities of Judea and Samaria, under illusions that the Palestinians had changed, and ahead of the era of peace, the then Palestinian policemen held light weapons, but the price of blood was expensive - over a thousand deaths we paid for the illusion Oslo, when the buses stopped exploding only after the IDF reoccupied the city centers. The concept of the deal with Hamas may cost much more, the months or years that the regulation will hold will serve to improve the capabilities of terrorist organizations but will never change their desire to destroy Israel, The problem this time is not about firearms, but missiles, skimmers and more, a port Days [?] are planned and the Lord will keep in.[?]  If the arrangement is not implemented, it will turn out that the right-wing government's illusion can rise even more heavily than the Rabin government's Oslo illusion.

Even in the days of Oslo, the illusion did not immediately burst, at least two years passed until the truth began to emerge, but when the Oslo war broke out - the price was expensive. It is important to remember, because here too, the "series" may cause a short-term calm, according to the terrorists' schedule, but when the "series" breaks out we will need a lot of prayers.

The buds of surrender to Hamas began in an article written by Maj. Gen. Sami Turgman (Southern Command general in Operation Protective Edge) in which he argued that in the near future Israel would have to come to terms with the reality that Hamas rules Gaza, and therefore the Gaza Strip must be invested[?]  through an international mechanism, even if it strengthens Hamas. In another article published several months ago in the issue of Between the Poles (in the Dedu Center for Interdisciplinary Military Thinking of the General Staff), the authors called for the Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip to be temporarily silent and an effort to thwart Hamas's attempts to export terror to Judea and Samaria.

In the "outline for a solution" presented by the Mecho
This concept also comes from outside. Tel Aviv University's National Security Studies has drawn up an outline that formed its former chief[s] of staff - Gantz, Ashkenazi and Ya'alon. Factors also identified by Netanyahu's policy, such as the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, or former Chief of Staff Yaakov Amidror, have in recent years published articles against the Hamas rule collapse and for the series[?] without prior decision.

Anyone who is confused or admired by the current or retired generals 'position can return to the generals' opinion before the Oslo Accords, or pre-deportation of Gush Katif Jews and withdrawal from the Gaza Area. But believers in G–d and his teachings are familiar with the Torah written: that any renunciation of part of the land of Israel will cost us a bloody price. It is precisely these days that things can be seen with tangible eyes, how anyone who does not want to conquer Gaza is mistaken for the imagination and illusions of the series in the face of Hamas terrorists, a growing terrorist organization that does not for a moment give up its desire to destroy us.

Understanding things is important, but its purpose is not only to expose the problems and highlight the bad, but to help understand what is the way of repair. It turns out that this issue is truly 'no right and no left' - not believing in it 'does not have the ability to act with active confidence against the narrow us, right and left trying to push the end when everyone knows what the price will be at the end.

A real security change, facing our enemies in general, and Gaza in particular, depends not only on the firepower and some dead terrorists (not that it matters), and also does not depend on the identity of one or another defense minister, wearing a skullcap or an outsider. A change in policy vis-à-vis Gaza requires strategic change, and a willingness to overwhelm Gaza to the end.

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